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Abstract Based on an industrial case study, we present a stochastic model of a
supply chain consisting of a set of buyers and suppliers and a group purchasing
organization (GPO). The GPO combines orders from buyers in a two-period model.
Demand and price in the second period are random. An advance selling opportunity
is available to all suppliers and buyers in the first-period market. Buyers decide how
much to buy through the GPO in the first period and how much to procure from the
market at a lower or higher price in the second period. Suppliers determine the
amount of capacity to sell through the GPO in the first period and to hold in reserve
in order to meet demand in the second period. The GPO conducts a uniform-price
reverse auction to select suppliers and decides on the price that will be offered to
buyers to maximize its profit. By determining the optimal decisions of buyers,
suppliers, and the GPO, we answer the following questions: Do suppliers and buyers
benefit from working with a GPO? How do the uncertainty in demand, the share of
GPO orders in the advance sales market, and the uncertainty in price influence the
players’ decisions and profits? What are the characteristics of an environment that
would encourage suppliers and buyers to work with a GPO? We show that a GPO
helps buyers and suppliers to mitigate demand and price risks effectively while
collecting a premium by serving as an intermediary between them.
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1 College of Engineering, Koç University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, Istanbul 34450, Turkey
2 College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Koç University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu,
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1 Introduction
Increasing intensity of competition has led companies to search for new business
models that improve their competitiveness and profitability. In situations where
companies are not able to achieve these goals on their own, they seek ways to
partner with other entities in the market in order to benefit from possible cost
reductions, demand pooling effects, higher capacity utilization, and improved
flexibility to respond to uncertainty in the business environment (Tan and Akçay
2014). The emergence of group purchasing organizations (GPOs) offers a practical
framework to benefit from cooperation in purchasing. Briefly, the term GPO refers
to an organization established to capitalize on the purchasing power of a group of
businesses. The mechanism is also referred to as joint procurement, purchasing
consortium, and cooperative purchasing (Nollet and Beaulieu 2003).
Industry-specific GPOs are observed in many industries such as health care,
manufacturing, food service, and pharmaceuticals (Nagarajan et al. 2010; Hu et al.
2012; Jin and Yu 2015). Non-industry-specific GPOs operate across different
sectors for procuring common products and fulfill aggregate non-strategic demand
for indirect supplies and services. The purchasing volume obtained by a GPO
through its members and the possibility of mitigating demand and price risks during
the selling season are the key factors that enable vendors to offer discounts. GPOs
also offer many services in addition to collective procurement, such as supplier
discovery, spend management, sourcing and contracting, data management, and
price benchmarking.
This study is based on a project implemented in a company that mainly manages
collective procurement of indirect materials and services for its customers. Tan
(2014) describes the project in detail as a case study. The company benefits from the
economies of scale generated by the collective purchasing power of its customers,
from its abilities to support customers’ procurement divisions with the expertise of
working in different business segments, and from managing supplier relations to
ensure the quality of services and products. Accordingly, the business model used in
this company is very similar to a group purchasing organization.
Suppliers used in a specific procurement project are selected according to the
result of an auction. For example, the logistics services managed and executed by
this company cover 810 destinations originating from 81 cities, exports to 65
countries, and imports from 17 countries. This company purchases thousands of
containers in a single procurement project. Similarly, for the procurement of
marketing materials such as promotional products and on-line portal services, more
than 3000 different products and services are offered by organizing approximately
5000 auctions in a year.
Several questions need to be answered to facilitate the successful operation of a
GPO: Do all parties in such a supply chain, namely, buyers, suppliers and GPO,
always benefit from cooperation on purchasing? Otherwise, how and under what
conditions does cooperation lead to non-beneficial outcomes for at least one of the
parties? How do factors such as demand variation, wholesale price, supplier
capacity, number of suppliers in the GPO, and number of buyers in the GPO
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influence the decision to participate? To address these research questions, we
develop a detailed two-period stochastic model with demand and price uncertainty.
As opposed to using a stylistic model that may not consider the details of operations
in this industrial setting, we fully characterize the optimal decisions of all parties in
the detailed model described in this study and determine their expected profits, both
with and without a purchasing organization. This analytic model allows us to
analyze the effects of system parameters on these decisions and determine the
conditions for successful GPO operations.
The main contributions of this study is developing a detailed analytic model of a
supply chain with several suppliers and buyers as well as a GPO, and determining
the conditions that lead to a beneficial cooperation for all parties in the market,
based on an industrial project. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytic
model in the literature that captures the dynamics of GPO operations and their
effects on suppliers and buyers under price and demand uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review
of the literature on supply chain models with group purchasing organizations and
contextualizes our contribution. We introduce our analytic model in Sect. 3 and
present the analysis in Sect. 4. We summarize the results of the numerical analysis
in Sect. 5. Finally, the conclusions and future research directions are provided in
Sect. 6.
2 Literature review
Numerous studies have examined cooperation among firms on production,
distribution, and sales in supply chains (e.g. Gerchak and Diwakar 1991; Benjaafar
et al. 2005; Tan and Akçay 2014; Yu et al. 2015). In this section, we focus only on
papers dealing with cooperation on procurement. Table 1 compares our work with
the existing literature discussed in this section.
The notion of purchasing group organizations and the motives behind using
GPOs are empirically discussed in Nollet and Beaulieu (2003), Tella and Virolainen
(2005), and Erhun (2010). Only a limited number of studies have analyzed group
purchasing organizations analytically. The papers that adopt the buyer’s and/or
GPO’s perspective to analyze the group purchasing mechanisms are listed as
follows. Saha et al. (2011) explore the decisions of large-demand buyers who join a
GPO but later decide to directly procure from the supplier by renegotiation in an
uncertain product price setting. They show that under high price uncertainty, a GPO
acts as a demand aggregator for small buyers and as an information provider for
large buyers. Chen and Roma (2011) show that group buying is always preferable
for homogeneous buyers in a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and
two buyers who compete for end customers. However, for heterogeneous buyers,
group purchasing is beneficial for the smaller buyer whereas it can be detrimental
for a larger one. Li (2012) examines the implications of buyer heterogeneity in the
context of group buying. The author finds that buyers can benefit from group buying
when the sellers’ bargaining power relative to that of the buyer group is low and/or
buyers’ preferences toward sellers are sufficiently differentiated. Zhou and Xie
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(2014) extend the work of Chen and Roma (2011) by considering the supplier as an
active member who determines the discount schedule based on whether retailers
choose individual or group buying. They find that group buying may hurt the
efficiency of the supply chain, and a mixed discount schedule can be used to prevent
these negative effects. In the work of Zhou et al. (2017), the potential role of group
purchasing organizations in facilitating information sharing and coordinating
horizontal competition is discussed from the buyer’s perspective. The authors reveal
that a GPO has the opportunity to gain significant advantages by addressing the
system inefficiencies due to double marginalization and information asymmetry.
The number of papers that focus on the suppliers perspective in the group buying
models is limited. Anand and Aron (2003) analyze the market and product
characteristics that incentivize a supplier to use the group buying mechanism and
compare the posted-pricing mechanism with the price-quantity schedule offered to
the group buying customers in different scenarios involving demand uncertainty and
economies of scale. Hu and Schwarz (2011) analytically address the effects of
contract administration fees that GPOs charge to suppliers and whether GPOs can
reduce procurement prices or total purchasing costs for their members. The authors
show that eliminating contract administration fees and having buyers pay for GPOs
contracting services instead of suppliers would have no effect on the profit or cost
function of any party in the market. Hu et al. (2012) examine the impact of a group
purchasing organization on a health-care product supply chain by using a game-
theoretic model that consists of a profit-maximizing supplier with a quantity-
discount schedule, a profit-maximizing GPO, and fixed-demand single-product.
They show that contract administration fees have a direct impact on the distribution
of profits between suppliers and group purchasing organizations. Yang et al. (2017)
study the group buying process from the suppliers perspective and emphasize that
the number of GPO members strongly influences the suppliers decision either to
contract or not with the GPO.
In addition, several studies consider group buying as a virtual sales channel for
suppliers, and compare it with the option of selling only to individuals (e.g. Luo and
Wang 2015; Tran and Desiraju 2017; Zhang and Liu 2017; Zhang et al. 2016).
Table 1 shows that most of the extant literature considers the GPO as a virtual
sales channel and does not explore the effect of group buying mechanism on the
revenues of all parties in the supply chain. In addition, none of these studies explore
the conditions that lead to a beneficial cooperation for all parties in the market when
the suppliers have limited capacity. Our model mainly differs in the detailed
operational modeling of a whole supply chain consisting of suppliers with limited
capacity, buyers with random demand and price, and a GPO that works with a
subset of profit-maximizing suppliers and buyers. The GPO is considered a risk-
neutral expected-profit maximizer, whose procurement process is modeled as a
uniform-price reverse auction mechanism. Price competition between buyers is not
considered since they act as a price taker in the market where there are a large
number of competitors. However, we allow buyers/suppliers who work with the
GPO to negotiate directly with others in the market in the first and second periods
before they decide to purchase/sell their commodities through the GPO. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature on GPOs to use detailed
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stochastic modeling of capacity setting, an auction mechanism, and advance order
commitments in a two period setting in which demand and price are random.
3 Model
The supply chain we examine consists of h symmetrical suppliers, n identical buyers
with stochastic demand for a single homogeneous product, and a GPO that operates
as an intermediary. Each party in the market is rational, risk-neutral, and seeks to
maximize its expected profit. The system is analyzed in two periods. The first period
is referred to as the advance selling period, and the second period as the selling
season. Advance selling is possible for all parties in the supply chain, and the
market price for the advance sales is wfp. As an alternative procurement channel, the
GPO announces a price for the first period, wr, to the potential buyers for the
organization. The list of notations used in our model is given Table 2.
3.1 Time sequence
The time sequence of the model is depicted in Fig. 1. In the first period, each
potential buyer i, i 2 1; 2; . . .; nf g decides on whether or not to use a GPO. When
the option of working with a GPO results in a higher profit than the market option,
the buyer procures all its advance orders at a unit price of wr and submits the
advance order quantity qG to the GPO. Since buyers are identical, the GPO
consolidates QG ¼ nqG units under this setting. When the buyers use the GPO
option in the first period, the structure of advance sales market will be as shown in
Fig. 2b. Buyer i prefers to procure qNG units from the advance selling market at a
unit price of wfp when the market option is more profitable. If the buyers prefer the
market option, that is, when qG ¼ 0 for each buyer, the GPO cannot function. In the
case where there is no functional GPO in the market, the advance sales market
structure will be as shown in Fig. 2a.
If qG [ 0, the GPO will organize a uniform-price reverse auction among the
potential suppliers in order to procure QG units. Each potential supplier j, where
j 2 1; 2; . . .; hf g, is invited to participate in the auction. When the option of working
with the GPO is more profitable compared to the market option, supplier j informs
the GPO that it will participate in the auction with an allocated capacity of DG.
Otherwise, supplier j will use the market option for both periods.
The GPO is able to operate only when the total capacity allocated by the
suppliers who participate in the auction is sufficient to provide QG units. When a
sufficient number of suppliers do not participate in the auction, no clearing price can
be determined. If the GPO cannot function, because buyers prefer the market option
or are unable to induce suppliers to allocate the required capacity, the suppliers and
the buyers use the market option for the first period.
When the conditions for conducting an auction are met, the participating
suppliers submit their price bids to the GPO. The GPO sorts all the submitted bids in
an ascending order and announces the winning bidders at the end of the first period.
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Table 2 A list of notations
h: The number of the suppliers who are members of
the GPO
n: The number of the buyers who are members of
the GPO
j: The index for the suppliers who are members of
the GPO
i: The index for the buyers who are members of the
GPO
wfp: The market price for the advance sales wr : The purchasing price offered by the GPO to the
buyers in the first period
Ws: The price the GPO pays to the suppliers at the
end of auction
ws: The expectation of Ws, E Ws½  ¼ ws
eg: The extra transaction cost that the GPO pays for
each procured item in the auction
ŵs: The estimation of the expected auction price in
which it is used by the supplier
er : The extra transaction cost that the buyer pays
when the market option is used in the first period
es: The extra transaction cost that the supplier pays
when the market option is used in the first period
Wsp: The wholesale price in the second period wsp: The expectation of Wsp, E Wsp
 
¼ wsp
p: The price charged by the buyers for the sales in
the second period
s: The salvage price
qG: The advance order quantity when a buyer
chooses to work with the GPO option
QG: Total advance order quantity consolidated by
the GPO
qNG: The advance order quantity when a buyer
chooses to work with the market option
QNGT : Total amount of advance orders procured in
the whole supply chain when there is no
functional GPO
s: The portion of the first period market captured
by the buyers who are members of the GPO,
s ¼ nqNG=QNGT
QGT : Total amount of advance orders procured in
the whole supply chain when there is a functional
GPO
c: The minimum premium guaranteed to the buyers
by the GPO
k: The order of the last winning supplier in the
auction, k ¼ dQG=DGe
Cj: The production cost of supplier j in which it is
uniformly distributed over the interval ½c; c
Ha: The number of suppliers that participate in the
auction
M: The total amount capacity a supplier has before
the selling season starts
DG: The capacity that is allocated by a participating
supplier for the GPO in the first period
DNG: The capacity allocated by a participating
supplier or non-participating supplier for the
advance order market when there is no GPO
D0NG: The capacity allocated by a non-participating
supplier for the the advance order market when
there is a functional GPO
b: The market share of a buyer on the total demand w: The market share of a supplier in the first and
second periods
DT : Total demand in the market including the first
and second periods
bDT : The demand for a buyer
FDT ðxÞ: The cumulative distribution function of the
total demand, DT
FBðyÞ: The cumulative distribution function of the
buyer’s demand, bDT
fDT ðxÞ: The probability density function of the total
demand, DT
fBðyÞ: The probability density function of the
buyer’s demand, bDT
DNGs : The second-period demand for a supplier
when there is no functional GPO in the market,
DNGs ¼ maxf0;w DT  QNGT
 
g
DGs : The second-period demand for a supplier when
there is a functional GPO in the market,
DGs ¼ maxf0;w DT  QGT
 
g
FDNGs ðzÞ: The conditional cumulative distribution
function of DNGs
FDGs ðuÞ: The conditional cumulative distribution
function of DGs
h: The lower bound for the probability of obtaining
a functional GPO in the market
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Since a uniform-price reverse auction is used to determine the price, each winning
supplier receives a unit price equal to the lowest losing bid. The advance order
quantities are delivered to the buyers immediately after the auction.
Since all deals between the potential buyers and suppliers are completed at the
GPO auction in the first period, the losing suppliers cannot sell their capacities in the
first period. The losing suppliers, as well as winning suppliers with remaining
capacity, can sell their products in the second market, along with the suppliers who
did not participate in the auction.
In the second period, the wholesale price at which buyers can absorb the
additional supply and the demand are observed. Each buyer’ demand is fully met
with the additional supply from the suppliers in the market at the second period
wholesale price. The buyers charge a retail price for each unit demanded. At the end
of the second period, each supplier receives a salvage value for each unit left unsold.
Finally, all the transactions are completed and the market clears.
3.2 Price model
Since a competitive advance sales market consists of a large number of suppliers
and buyers, each individual party in the market acts as a price taker. The market
price for advance sales, wfp, is considered exogenous and is perfectly known at the
time suppliers and buyers decide to participate in the GPO before the selling season
starts.
The price that the GPO charges to the buyers, wr, is perfectly known to all buyers
before they decide whether or not to participate in the GPO. The GPO determines wr
so as to maximize its expected profit. The price the GPO pays to the suppliers,Ws, is
determined by an auction mechanism. Therefore, it is a random variable with the
expectation E Ws½  ¼ ws.
The wholesale price in the second period, Wsp, is also a random variable with the
expectation E Wsp
 
¼ wsp. All parties in the market perfectly know wsp before the
selling season starts. Since wfp and wr are constant prices known before the selling
GPO announces
its price, wr.
Each buyer i decides
on whether or not to
procure through
GPO channel
in the first period.
If the option of
working with GPO
brings more benefit
for the buyer, then
qG > 0. So, QG = nqG
units are collected by
GPO. Otherwise, GPO
dissolves, and buyers
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Fig. 1 Time sequence for the model
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season starts, the wholesale price in the second period is considered as an
independent variable from them. In addition, the wholesale price in the second
period does not depend the total demand in the market. This consideration can be
justified when the market is so competitive that the parties in the market essentially










































































Fig. 2 Illustrations of the models for the first period a when there is no GPO, b when there is a functional
GPO in the market
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The price charged by the buyers for customer sales in the second period, p, is
constant and given exogenously. We assume that p[wsp [ max wr;wfp
 
because
operating as a buyer in the market is clearly not profitable when
max wsp;wr;wfp
 
 p and wsp [ p[ max wr;wfp
 
. In addition, procuring in the
first period either through the GPO or through the market does not create added
value for the buyer when max p;wr;wfp
 
wsp. A case in which advance
procurement is possible only through the GPO in this price setting can also be
analyzed with wfp set sufficiently high, that is, wfp [wsp. The salvage value is
denoted by s.
3.3 Demand model
Total demand in the market, DT , includes the demand in the first and second
periods. DT is a random variable with the probability density function fDT ðxÞ and the
cumulative density function FDT ðxÞ. FDT ðxÞ is a continuous and twice-differentiable
function where FDT ðxÞ ¼ 0 for all x 0 and fDT ðxÞ[ 0 for all x[ 0.
Buyer i, i 2 1; 2; . . .; nf g, can get only a portion of the demand, depending on its
market share b, 0\b\1=n. The demand for buyer i is bDT , which has a cumulative
distribution function FBðyÞ and density function fBðyÞ. The other buyers in the
market who do not participate in the GPO manage their procurement activities on
their own by using the market option for both periods. Their potential demand is the
remaining portion of the total demand, that is, 1 nbð ÞDT .
For both periods, all buyers in the market prioritize the suppliers who are invited
to participate in the auction as preferred business partners. Accordingly, the other
suppliers are used as a spot market when all potential suppliers for the GPO are
unable to satisfy the demand in one of the periods.
When there is no functional GPO in the market, as shown in Fig. 2a, the buyers
procure nqNG units of advance orders in total at a unit price of wfp. nqNG captures s
percent of the whole advance sales market and this information is known to all
market participants. In this setting, the total amount of advance orders procured in





. Since qNG is a decreasing
function of wfp and s is a constant, the total amount of advance orders procured in
the whole supply decreases as the market price for advance sales increases.




. With no functional GPO in the market, as shown in Fig. 2a,
supplier j can get a maximum of wQNGT units in the first period. Since the total
demand decreases by QNGT units at the end of the first period due to advance sales in
the market, the potential suppliers share the remaining demand in the second period
according to their market shares. The buyers procure additional supply if their
demand in the second period is positive. Accordingly, where there is no functional
GPO in the market, the second-period demand for supplier j, DNGs , follows a
conditional distribution given that it is positive. The conditional cumulative
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distribution function is denoted with FDNGs ðzÞ, where D
NG
s ¼ maxf0;w DT  QNGT
 
g
given that w DT  QNGT
 
[ 0.
When there is a functional GPO in the market, as depicted in Fig. 2b, the buyers
who are members of the GPO procure QG ¼ nqG units. Since the other buyers in the
market still trade at the market price wfp, their total advance order quantity remains
the same, equal to
1 sð ÞnqNG
s
. In this setting, the total amount of advance orders
procured in the whole supply chain is QGT ¼ QG þ
1 sð ÞnqNG
s
and the buyers who
are members of the GPO capture
QG
QGT
percent of the whole advance sales market.
Suppliers who participate in the auction compete for a portion of QG units in the first
period, and the non-participating suppliers appropriate the remaining advance orders
according to their market shares. After the first period, the total demand in the
market decreases by QGT units. As a result, the supplier’s demand in the second
period follows a conditional distribution, with the cumulative distribution function
being FDGs ðuÞ, where D
G
s ¼ maxf0;w DT  QGT
 
g given that w DT  QGT
 
[ 0.
3.4 Model of the buyer
We consider buyers who enter the market to procure a homogeneous non-direct
material, such as stationery, a service, or container space for transportation.
Therefore, competition between buyers is not considered here.
Buyers always meet their demand either using the GPO in the first period and the
market in the second period or using only the market in both periods; that is, there
are no lost sales on the buyers’ side.
Buyers pay an extra unit of transaction cost, er, for each item procured through
their own efforts. This cost covers the expenses for supplier selection, transporta-
tion, and administrative services.
3.5 Model of the supplier
For all suppliers, an opportunity to install capacity occurs well before the selling
season. Therefore, we consider a case where supplier j, decides the capacity, M,
before the selling season starts. In our setting, the production capacity can also be
thought of as on-hand inventory before the selling season starts. For instance, the
truck fleet or container space that a logistics company owns can also be considered
as capacity in our setting.
Each of the potential suppliers for the GPO decides to allocate a portion of its
capacity either to the GPO, which will pay a unit price Ws in the first period, or to
the advance sales market, which will provide a unit price wfp. The supplier chooses
one of these two possible options according to its expected profit. When supplier j
evaluates the option of working with the GPO as more profitable, it decides on the
allocated capacity for the GPO, DG, and the bid to be submitted in the auction. DG
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cannot be partitioned by the GPO, and it cannot exceed the amount of advance
orders consolidated in the GPO, that is, 0DG QG.
The production cost per unit, Cj, of supplier j, is assumed to be private
information. Without any information, each party in the market believes that Cj is
distributed uniformly over the interval ½c; c. To avoid trivial cases, we assume
c[ s. Suppliers pay an extra unit transaction cost, es, for each item sold by their
own efforts. This cost covers the expenses for transportation and administrative
services.
The number of suppliers in the purchasing organization is treated as private
information by the GPO in order to avoid collusion. Otherwise, the suppliers may
collude to manipulate the auction price, and the GPO will never become functional.
Lacking information on the number of suppliers, supplier j uses a single-point
estimation of the expected Ws to derive its profit function (for a similar assumption,
see, e.g., Hao 2000).
The single-point estimation of the expected auction price, ŵs, is based on
historical data and is common for all suppliers. In the numerical experiments for our
setting, we only consider cases where the point estimation of the expected auction
price, ŵs, does not significantly deviate from the realized value, varying at most by
± 5% of the realized value.
3.6 Model of the group purchasing organization
The GPO invites h suppliers to work in the auction. However, the number of
suppliers it will work with will depend on the capacities that the suppliers allocate to
the GPO. Since each supplier submits an allocated capacity of DG as a batch in the
auction, the GPO will work with k ¼ QG
DG
 	
suppliers to fulfill the total advance
order quantity coming from its customers. This implies that the amount of kDG is
going to be procured at the end of auction, and a portion of the purchased items,
kDG  QGð Þ, remains in the hands of the GPO. The excess amount of the purchased
products is assumed to be sold at the salvage price s.
If the GPO attempts to compete with suppliers by selling the remaining amount
of supply in the second period, the market will collapse for the suppliers, and the
GPO will be the monopolist. Accordingly, no suppliers may be willing to work with
the GPO. The competition boards in practice make regulations on these issues to
preserve the fair market competition and to prevent market manipulations. In this
setting, making the GPO sell the extra amount of supply at the salvage value forces
the GPO to match supply and demand as closely as possible.
The GPO also pays an extra unit transaction cost, eg, for each procured item in
the auction. This cost covers the expenses for transportation, supplier selection, and
administrative services. The effect of economies of scale on the transaction cost is
imposed considering that max es; erf g eg.
Since the number of suppliers in the GPO is not public information in the market,
the suppliers and buyers are not able to estimate the probability of existence of a
functional purchasing organization. The GPO therefore specifies a lower bound for
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the probability of obtaining a functional GPO in the market, represented by h. h can
be considered as a service level that is offered by the GPO to its partners. In
practice, it is estimated from the historical data set and justified based on the
experts’ opinions. Specifically, the parties in the market use h to decide whether to
participate in the auction. This information is shared truthfully with the other parties
in the market (for a similar analysis, see, e.g., Moinzadeh 2002; Cachon and
Marshall 2000; Aviv and Federgruen 1998).
4 Analysis of the model
In this section, we analyze the described model and present the analysis results. For
clarity, we normalize all financial parameters to the salvage value s by setting s ¼ 0
without loss of generality.
Before analyzing the model, we introduce a particular setting as an example to
clarify the operation of a GPO and the modeling assumptions. In the model, we
consider a particular setting where the buyers are identical in terms of the unit
production cost, retailing price, and demand for analytical tractability of the model.
This particular setting can be used to model firms that work with powerful buyers.
For example, in textile-apparel industry, a large buyer works with many small-to-
medium size firms and sets a price for its products considering the market
conditions. A small firm cannot influence the market price dynamics and only
compete to get an order. Additionally, although different styles of apparel products
may vary greatly in their characters such as color and appearance, there is typically
no significant difference in the production costs (Zhou et al. 2015). In such a setting,
in order to decrease the production or procurement costs, the firms typically either
join or form a group purchasing organization and collectively manage the
procurement of indirect materials and services.
With the market structure mentioned above, let us consider collaborative
procurement of containers used by a group of firms to ship products to a particular
location. The market price for container shipments directly depends on the fuel cost
used to transfer the items from one destination to another. As a result, the market
price for the current market (the advance selling period) is typically known by all
parties in the market. However, since the fuel price fluctuates according to the
commodity market and since the global demand for containers changes with time,
the market price for container shipments for the next period (the selling season) is
uncertain. Therefore, the suppliers and buyers generally use the advance sales
option to mitigate the price risks effectively. Under this setting, the only difference
among the suppliers is the fixed cost related to installed capacity, i.e., truck fleet and
containers. Due to this fact, in our setting, the suppliers differ from each other in
terms of the production cost or service cost.
Before an auction takes place, the GPO performs a comprehensive cost analysis
to determine the reasonable price and success probability for the project. Given the
price offered by the GPO, the market price in the advance sales period, and the
market price in the selling season, each firm first decides how many containers it
will buy from the GPO. If the buyers are interested, the GPO consolidates these
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orders and invites suppliers to an auction for, say, a total of 2000 containers for its
members. A supplier who has 100 containers available may decide to allocate 80 of
them to the GPO, which organizes an auction for the procurement. We assume that
if this supplier firm is deemed to be one of the winners of the auction, it supplies 80
containers, but does not accept requests for the supply of, say, 73 containers. The
supplier solves an optimization problem to determine the number of containers that
will be offered to the GPO in the advance sales period and the number of containers
that will be kept for the market in the sales season. In this optimization, the suppliers
know that if the total demand for containers is 10,000 on average, the GPO, which
procures 2000 containers in the advance selling period, decreases the available
demand for them in the selling season. From this information, the GPO can
determine how the buyers and suppliers will decide to optimize their expected
profits. The GPO consolidates the information to determine the price that will be
offered to the buyers to maximize its expected profit.
4.1 Analysis of buyers
For a buyer who considers working directly with the suppliers in the first period,
without joining the GPO, the expected profit, E½PNGr ðqNGÞ, is
E PNGr ðqNGÞ
 
¼ pE bDT½   wfp þ er
 
qNG  wsp þ er
 
E bDT  qNGð Þþ
 
: ð1Þ
The first term is the total revenue, the second term is the cost of advance purchasing,
and the last term is the cost of purchasing in the second period.
For a buyer who considers the option of working with the GPO in the first period,
the estimated profit function is given as
E P̂Gr ðqGÞ
 
¼ h pE bDT½   wrqG  wsp þ er
 
E bDT  qGð Þþ
  




The first term represents the buyer’s profit when there is a functional GPO in the
market, and the second term denotes the buyer’s profit when the GPO cannot
operate due to an insufficient number of suppliers in the auction.
Note that the buyer analysis is based on the lower bound of the probability that a
functional GPO operates in the market, h. Using the probability that a functional
GPO operates in the market instead of the lower bound, we can obtain the expected
profit for the buyer, E½PGr ðqGÞ. Since h is the lower bound, the buyer’s expected
profit is always more than or equal to the expected profit obtained by using the
estimated probability.
The optimal advance order quantities for the market and GPO options are derived
by maximization of the expected profit functions in Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively.
The optimal order quantities for both the options are stated in the following
proposition. The proofs are provided in ‘‘Appendix A’’.
Proposition 1 For a given wr quoted by the GPO, the buyer will work with the
GPO in the first period when E½P̂Gr ðqGÞ  E½PNGr ðqNGÞ  0. In this case, the
optimal advance order quantity is defined as















In addition, the total advance order quantity consolidated in the GPO is QG ¼ nqG.
On the other hand, when E½P̂Gr ðqGÞ  E½PNGr ðqNGÞ\0, the buyer will use the














Comparing E½P̂Gr ðqGÞ with E½PNGr ðqNGÞ gives the condition that induces the
buyer to work with the GPO, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For the given parameters wsp þ er  max wr;wfp þ er
 
, the buyer
will work with GPO in first period when wr wfp þ er.
4.2 Analysis of suppliers
Each supplier decides whether to participate in the auction with no information on
the number of suppliers in the GPO. Therefore, a supplier’s profit function is
derived from the estimated auction price and the lower bound of the probability that
a functional GPO operates in the market. Supplier j does not expect to be one of the
winners in the auction if its production cost, Cj ¼ c, is greater than or equal to the
estimated auction price, that is, c ŵs. If the supplier prefers to participate in the
auction rather than use the market option where c ŵs, the supplier will have no
chance of selling its capacity to the GPO, and will lose the opportunity to join the
advance selling market. Therefore, where a supplier loses the auction with a GPO
operating in the market, the supplier’s expected profit function is defined as in the
first component of the following equation; the second term represents a case with no
functional GPO in the market:
E P̂Gsj DNGð Þjc ŵs
h i










þ wsp  es
 






On the other hand, a supplier whose production cost is less than ŵs expects to be one
of the winners in the auction. However, the probability of winning in the auction
cannot be determined by the supplier. The supplier derives its expected profit
function with the expectation that it would definitely win at the end of the auction.
Thus, the expected profit function of the supplier is defined as
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E P̂Gsj DG;DNGð Þjc\ŵs
h i
¼ h ŵsDG þ wsp  es
 








þ wsp  es
 






The first term is the expected profit of the supplier given that a GPO is operational
and the supplier is one of the winners at the end of the auction. The second term
represents a case in which no GPO can operate in the market.
Once a supplier decides to trade with the market in the first period, its expected
profit does not change based on whether its production cost is greater than or equal
to ŵs. Accordingly, the expected profit of the supplier selling to the market in the











þ wsp  es
 
E min M  D0NG;DGs
  
 cM




þ wsp  es
 




The first component expresses the profit function for a case where a GPO operates
but the supplier does not participate in the auction. The second term represents a
case where there is no functional GPO in the market. Essentially, for both of the
components, the total revenue for the supplier can be expressed as the sum of
revenues obtained from sales to individual buyers in the first and second periods.
However, since the second-period demand for supplier j directly depends on whe-
ther or not a functional GPO operates in the market, the allocated capacity for the
advance order market changes. When no GPO can operate due to an insufficient
number of suppliers in the auction, a non-participating supplier allocates DNG units
of its capacity for the advance order market. On the other hand, if an operational
GPO exists in the market, the allocated capacity for the first period will be D0NG.
The optimal allocated capacities for all the options are expressed in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the GPO yields more benefits for supplier j, with production cost
less than the estimated auction price, the supplier will be eager to trade with the
GPO. In this case, it allocates
DG ¼















Supplier jnever assigns a portion of its capacity to the GPO if its production cost cis
greater than or equal to the estimated auction price, that is, c ŵs.
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When a supplier evaluates the market option as more beneficial, the portion of its
capacity that it will allocate to the buyers in the market when the GPO is opera-





































The condition that induces a supplier to favorably evaluate the option of working
with the GPO, in terms of the expressions of allocated capacities for the different
cases above, is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When a supplier’s production cost is less than the estimated
























when ŵswfpes and wrwfpþer, the above inequality definitely holds. With
c\ŵs, therefore, supplier jbelieves that the GPO will be beneficial.
On the other hand, suppliers whose production costs are greater than or equal to
the estimated auction price would never believe that the GPO is beneficial for them.
Therefore, they would never participate in the auction.
Proposition 4 implies that given c\ŵs, supplier j definitely chooses the GPO
option in the market when it believes the auction price will be higher than the
market price in the first period and the GPO plays a market maker role for the
suppliers.
Since a supplier uses the estimated auction price to make its capacity allocation
decision, its expected profit will be different than the estimated one. With the
chosen optimal capacity allocations, the expected profit function for any supplier j is










¼P Ha  k þ 1f gPfc\WsgwsDG
þ P Ha  k þ 1f gPfc\Wsg wsp  es
 
E min M  DG;DGs
  
þ P Ha  k þ 1f gPfcWsg wsp  es
 
E min M;DGs
   
þ P Ha\k þ 1f g wfp  es
 
DNG  cM
þ P Ha\k þ 1f g wsp  es
 
E min M  DNG;DNGs
  
ð12Þ
where ws is the expected auction price, Ha is the number of bidders in the auction,
and P Ha  k þ 1f g is the probability of obtaining an operational GPO in the market.
These terms are detailed in the next section.
Since the auction price is the lowest losing bid, the probability of being one of the
winners in the auction is equivalent to P Cj ¼ c\Ws
 
¼ P Cj ¼ c\C kþ1ð Þ
 
.
Considering the fact that for any selected supplier j, c can be assigned to k empty
places before the ðk þ 1Þth order and it can be selected from h suppliers, this





4.3 Analysis of auction
With incomplete information on the suppliers’ production costs, the GPO uses a
uniform-price reverse auction to select the suppliers and determine the purchasing
price. The uniform-price reverse auction is a multi-unit auction in which a fixed
number of identical units of a homogeneous commodity are purchased for the same
price (Krishna 2002). In our model, the assumptions on the auction and suppliers
guarantee that the discriminatory auction, in which identical units of a single item
are sold at different prices, and the uniform-price auction yield the same expected
revenue for the GPO. We next investigate the bidding behavior of the suppliers
when they participate in such a purchasing organization with a uniform-price
reverse auction in a two-period stochastic model. Proposition 5 states that bidding a
value other than the supplier’s actual production cost does not improve the
supplier’s payoff in this structure.
Proposition 5 When every bidder demands just a single batch, and can indeed bid
for only one batch, a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium results such that all bidders reveal
their true condition; that is, the suppliers bid at their actual production costs.
The above proposition shows that the dominant strategy for a supplier is to reveal
the truth and bid at its actual cost. The main rationale behind this result is that the
supplier cannot set DG strategically to manipulate the auction price due to lack of
information on the number of suppliers in the GPO.
If the conditions required for a GPO to operate in the market are met, only
suppliers whose production cost is less than ŵs might participate in the auction.
Since the unit production cost is a supplier’s private information, and the other
parties in the market only know the distribution that it follows, the number of
suppliers that participate in the auction, Ha, is a random variable. It is expressed as






where I is an indicator function that takes 0 or 1 depending on the condition Cj\ŵs.
Therefore, Ha has a binomial distribution with the following probability mass
function:







where pa ¼ PfCj\ŵsg ¼
ŵs  c
c c : ð14Þ
To be able to perform a uniform-price reverse auction, the number of suppliers in
the auction must be greater than or equal to ðk þ 1Þ. Otherwise, the clearing price
cannot be determined and no purchasing organization would be functional. There-
fore, the probability of obtaining a functional GPO in the market is defined as













When there is a functional GPO in the market, the ðk þ 1Þst minimum of Ha
uniformly distributed numbers is paid to all winners. The expectation regarding this
payment is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When the production cost of each supplier who participates in the
auction is uniformly distributed between c and ŵs and when the number of bidders
Ha follows a binomial distribution, the expected auction price, ws, is defined as in
the following expression:
ws ¼E½Ws ¼ E½Cðkþ1ÞjHa  k þ 1
















4.4 Analysis of the group purchasing organization




E½PGPO ¼ P Ha  k þ 1f g QGwr  kDG ws þ eg
  
ð17Þ
s:to E½PGr ðqGÞ  E½PNGr ðqNGÞ  E ð18Þ
P Ha  k þ 1f g h ð19Þ
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E½PGPO  0 ð20Þ
Equation (17) gives the GPO’s expected profit, that is, the difference between the
total amount of money received from the buyers and the total amount of money paid
to suppliers plus transaction expenses.
The individual rationality constraint for a single buyer is defined as in Eq. (18).
The GPO knows that buyers would not join the organization without an incentive—
the increased profit that the GPO option provides. To encourage buyer participation,
the GPO provides a minimum premium to each buyer, setting its offered price at the
maximum of ð1 cÞðwfp þ erÞ, where c 2 ½0; 1. Hence, it guarantees that buyers
obtain premiums from the GPO. Thus, the incentive rationality constraint for the
buyers would always be greater than a positive E value. Since potential buyers are
identical, it is sufficient that a single buyer meet this constraint.
Since the GPO shares the lower bound of the probability that a GPO operates in
the market with its partners, Eq. (19) ensures that the probability of a functional
GPO operating in the market is greater than or equal to this value. Finally, Eq. (20)
ensures that operating in the market is beneficial for the GPO.
Since k is defined as the rounded-up value of a fraction involving QG in Eq. (15),
the objective function has a discontinuous form, which means it contains one or
more breaks on 0; ð1 cÞðwfp þ erÞ
 
. In addition, QG and D

G, defined in Eqs. (3)
and (8), are the partial functions of wr. From these results, the above problem has a
non-linear objective function that does not yield a closed-form solution when
optimized with respect to wr for the general case. In order to determine the optimal
value of wr numerically, we use a uniform line search algorithm over the closed
interval 0; ð1 cÞðwfp þ erÞ
 
. wr, which has the largest value for Eq. (17) and
satisfies all the constraints, is picked as the solution of the problem. If there is no
solution such that all constraints are satisfied, then it is concluded that the GPO
would not be functional for that set of system parameters.
5 Numerical results
In this section, we investigate the effects of system parameters by using an analytic
model that describes the optimal decisions of suppliers, buyers, and the GPO
through numerical experiments. All the analytic results are validated by a simulation
of the system. Since the results depend on the optimal decisions of the buyers,
suppliers, and the GPO, the analytic results derived in this study allow evaluation of
the system much more efficiently compared to a similar performance evaluation
study based on simulation.
For all instances, the system parameters are set as follows: The retail price p,
which is charged from the end customer for each of the demanded units, is assigned
as p = 45. Since it would not affect any decisions that parties in the market take,
only a single value for this parameter is considered in the numerical analysis. The
minimum premium guaranteed to the buyers by the GPO set to c ¼ 10% for all
instances, as stated in the work of Tan (2014). The lower bound of the probability of
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obtaining a functional GPO should be chosen as high as possible, therefore it is set
to h ¼ 90%. The extra transaction costs for the buyers, suppliers, and the GPO are
selected as er ¼ 5, es ¼ 3, and eg ¼ 1, respectively. In all instances, the total
demand distribution, DT , is assumed to be uniform. Under the uniform demand
assumption, Propositions 1, 3, and 4 can be stated in a closed form. The closed-form
expressions for the uniformly distributed demand case are given in ‘‘Appendix B’’.
In addition, we only consider cases where the point estimation for the expected
auction price ŵs varies at most by ± 5% of its realized value, that is,
jws  ŵsj  0:05ws, in order to limit the effects of wrong estimations on the results.
We use a wide range of test problems in order to assess the effects of buyers’ and
suppliers’ market shares, the variability of production cost, the variability of total
demand, the market price for advance sales, and the share of GPO orders in the
advance sales market on the profits of the parties in the supply chain. For this
purpose, we consider variations around the base scenario introduced in above. At
the beginning of each subsection where we address the effect of considered
parameters, we present the details related to how these variations are configured. For
the range of parameters analyzed in the numerical experiments, the GPO’s
optimization problem defined in Sect. 4.4 gives the optimal price offered by the
GPO to its customers as wr ¼ ð1 cÞðwþ erÞ. That means that the buyers enjoy
higher profits compared to the market option, since wr is always less than the sum of
transaction expenses for the buyer and market price for the first period, when GPO is
functional. With these arguments, the premium that the buyer gains from the GPO
can be directly determined for a given set of parameters. Therefore, the numerical
analysis related to the buyer’s profit is not presented in this section. In addition, to

















and use it in the numerical analysis of
the supplier’s expected profit.
5.1 Effects of buyer’s and supplier’s market shares
For the analysis of the impacts of buyer’s and supplier’s market shares on the profits
of the parties in the supply chain, we define a basic scenario where wsp ¼ 30,
wfp ¼ 20, p = 45, n = 10, s ¼ 70%, dT ¼ 50;000, dT ¼ 80;000, c ¼ 10, c ¼ 12,
er ¼ 5, es ¼ 3, eg ¼ 1, M = 10,000, h ¼ 90%, and c ¼ 10%. We create three
different variations of the scenario considering the following values for the buyer’s
market share: nb ¼ 0:33 (n = 10, b ¼ 0:033), nb ¼ 0:50 (n = 10, b ¼ 0:05), and
nb ¼ 0:67 (n = 10, b ¼ 0:067). In each variation, the suppliers’ total market share,
hw, is changed from 0.02 to 0.98 with an incremental value of 0.02. For the given
values of buyer’s market share and suppliers’ total market share, we generate a set
of problem instances by ranging the number of suppliers from 30 to 80, i.e.,
h 2 30; 31; 32; . . .; 80f g. With this configuration setting, 2499 problem instances are
generated for every variation of the basic scenario.
In each set of problem configured for the given values of buyer’s market share
and suppliers’ total market share, the average, maximum, and minimum of the
Analysis of a group purchasing organization under demand... 865
123
profits that the GPO and supplier obtain are determined. They are depicted for the
GPO and supplier in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
Having partners with a strong market position in terms of market share in the
supply and demand markets affects the expected profit functions of the GPO and the
suppliers. Figure 3 shows that an increase in the buyer’s market share has a positive
impact on the expected profit of the GPO. Because, the GPO sells more advance
orders to its customers with an increase in b, the revenue from advance sales
increases. Figure 3 also indicates that the average profit level of the GPO increases
as the market share of a supplier increases for a given nb. The main rationale behind
this pattern is that the amount of excess inventory potentially due to batch selling in
the auction, (QG  kDG), decreases as the supplier’s market share increases.
Figure 4 shows that the GPO is highly beneficial for the supplier when the total
market share of the suppliers in the GPO is less than hw ¼ 0:2. As the market share
of a supplier increases for a given nb, the marginal benefit of the GPO decreases for
the supplier and converges to almost zero after hw ¼ 0:9. Figure 4 also indicates
that an upward change in the buyer’s market share increases the benefit that a
supplier derives from the GPO. However, with an increase in the supplier’s market
share, the positive impact of the high b in the expected profit function of supplier
also disappears. These observations imply that the GPO serves as a market maker
for the supplier in case of a small market share for a single supplier, w, and a high
market share for a single buyer in the GPO, b, so that the supplier benefits more
from the GPO.
5.2 Effects of market price for advance sales and share of GPO order
in the advance sales market
In order to analyze the impacts of market price for advance sales and share of GPO
order in the advance sales market on the profits of the parties in the supply chain, we
describe a basic scenario in which wsp ¼ 30, p ¼ 45, h ¼ 50, b ¼ 0:05, w ¼ 0:015,
dT ¼ 50;000, dT ¼ 80;000, c ¼ 10, c ¼ 12, er ¼ 5, es ¼ 3, eg ¼ 1, M ¼ 10;000,
h ¼ 90%, and c ¼ 10%. Three different variations of the scenario are constructed
with the following values of the advance sales market price: wfp ¼ 18, wfp ¼ 21, and
wfp ¼ 24. In each variation, the share of GPO order in the advance sales market, s, is
changed from 0.65 to 1 with an incremental value of 0.007. For the given values of
market price for advance sales and share of GPO order in the advance sales market,
we generate a set of problem instances by ranging the number of buyers from 1 to
50, i.e., n 2 1; 2; 3; . . .; 50f g. With this configuration setting, 2500 problem
instances are generated for every variation of the basic scenario.
In each set of problem configured for the given values of market price for
advance sales and share of GPO order in the advance sales market, the average,
maximum, and minimum of the profits that the GPO and supplier obtain are
determined. Figures 5 and 6 respectively show how changes in the price of the
advance sales market, wfp, and the share of the GPO order in the advance sales
market, s, affect the average profit levels of the GPO and suppliers, as well as the
maximum and minimum profit levels of the GPO and suppliers.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































870 O. Karabağ, B. Tan
123
In Fig. 5, for a given s value, the average profit level of the GPO rises
significantly when the wholesale price increases in the first period. With an increase
in wfp, the GPO will have an opportunity to set its price at a higher level so that its
marginal benefit per product is higher. Figure 5 also shows that for a given wfp, the
average profit level of the GPO usually slightly rises with an increase in the share of
GPO orders in the advance sales market.
Figure 6 indicates that the GPO’s positive impact on the supplier’s expected
profit rises with an increase in the value of s for a given wfp. With a high s, the GPO
serves as a market maker for the suppliers, because only a small group of non-
participating buyers can trade in the advance sales market. Accordingly, partici-
pation in GPO gives the suppliers a chance to sell their idle capacities in the first
period. For the advance sales market, Fig. 6 shows that the GPO benefit in the
supplier’s expected profit declines with an increase in the market price.
Consequently, when the market price for advance sales, that is, wfp, is low and
when GPO buyers represent a high portion of total advance orders, namely, s is
high, the marginal benefit of the GPO has an increasing effect on the suppliers’
profit.
5.3 Effects of variabilities of production cost and total demand
Figures 7 and 8 depict the effects of variation in total demand and production costs,
represented by the coefficients of variation of demand cvDTð Þ and production cost
cvCj
 
, on the average profit levels of the GPO and supplier, respectively.
For the analysis, we define a basic scenario where wsp ¼ 30, wfp ¼ 20, p ¼ 45,
n ¼ 10, h ¼ 50, b ¼ 0:05, w ¼ 0:015, s ¼ 70%, er ¼ 5, es ¼ 3, eg ¼ 1, h ¼ 90%,
and c ¼ 10%. We create three different variations of the scenario considering the
following values for the coefficient of variation of the total demand in the market:
cvDT ¼ 0:13, cvDT ¼ 0:31, and cvDT ¼ 0:49. In each variation, the coefficient of
variation of production cost, cvcj , is changed from 0.05 to 0.30 with an incremental
value of 0.005. For the given values of the coefficients of variation of demand and
production cost, we generate a set of problem instances by ranging the supplier’s
total capacity from 3000 to 10,000 with an incremental step of 250, i.e.,
M 2 3000; 3250; 3500; . . .; 15000f g. With this configuration setting, 2500 problem
instances are generated for every variation of the basic scenario.
Figure 7 shows that the average profit level of the GPO increases with production
cost variability. When production cost variability increases, the lower bound of the
distribution of production cost and, in turn, the expected auction price decrease. As
the expected auction price decreases the GPO’s expected profit increases while the
supplier’s expected profit decreases. As a result, Fig. 8 shows that the GPO benefit
in the supplier’s expected profit slightly declines with an increase in the production
cost variability.
For the same average demand, dT decreases with an increase in cvDT . This leads
to a decrease in the GPO’s total revenue from advance sales. Therefore, as Fig. 7
shows, the average profit level of the GPO declines as the coefficient of variation of
total demand increases. When cvDT increases, the GPO’s marginal benefit also has a
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decreasing effect on the supplier’s expected profit as a result of the GPO-driven
market downsizing in the first period (see Fig. 8).
5.4 Managerial insights
Based on these numerical results, we summarize our main findings, which provide
managerial insights into the operation of the group purchasing organization and its
effects on suppliers and buyers, as follows:
1. Where the market share of a supplier is small, the supplier’s profit significantly
increases through GPO participation. This result can be attributed to the fact
that participating in the GPO provides the supplier an opportunity to reach a
sizable advance sales market in the first period, which cannot be done on its
own. In addition, the profit of the GPO increases as the expected auction price
and the excessive amount of supply from the auction decline with a decrease in
the supplier’s market share.
2. Participating in the GPO benefits the supplier in case the buyer’s market share is
high. However, the positive impact of a high buyer’s market share on the
expected profit of the supplier disappears when the supplier’s market share goes
up. Under this setting, the GPO loses its role as a market maker for the
suppliers. An increase in the buyer’s market share leads to more buying power
and advance sales orders for the GPO. By using this advantage, the GPO sells
more products to its customers, lowering the auction price in their favor.
Accordingly, a higher buyer’s market share implies a higher premium for the
GPO.
3. High variation in production cost improves the GPO’s profit but adversely
affects the supplier’s profit. The lower bound of the supplier’s production cost
declines under this setting, leading to a decrease in the expected auction price.
4. For the GPO, the total revenue obtained from advance sales decreases with an
increase in the variation in total demand. For the suppliers, the increase in
variation also leads to a market loss in the first period. Therefore, the GPO
benefit declines for both parties as the variation in demand increases.
5. When the share of GPO orders in the advance sales market increases, the GPO
provides added value to suppliers by offering them a chance to sell their idle
capacities in the first period. In other words, the GPO plays a market maker role
for the suppliers under this setting. On the other hand, since the expected
auction price tends to decrease with an increase in the share of GPO orders in
the advance sales market, the profit function of the GPO goes up.
6. As the market price for advance sales rises, the GPO can set its price at a higher
level. Hence, for the GPO, the marginal profit per item procured through its
channel increases. In addition, since the market price for the first period
increases, the positive impact of the GPO on the supplier’s expected profit
decreases.
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6 Conclusion
We present a detailed two-period stochastic model in which there is a group
purchasing organization working with a set of buyers and suppliers under demand
and price uncertainty. In this model, advance sales opportunities are available in the
first period to all parties in the market. The buyers and suppliers decide whether to
cooperate with the GPO in the first period. If they do, the GPO employs a uniform-
price reverse auction to determine the procurement price and to select the suppliers
to be used for procuring advance orders of its customers. This model captures the
main dynamics observed in the industrial case accurately described in Tan (2014).
Under this setting, we first characterize how buyers optimally decide whether to
use the option of working with the GPO and how much to buy through advance
order opportunities to maximize their profits. We then analyze the suppliers’
decisions on participation in the GPO and capacity they would sell in the first
period. Furthermore, the analysis for the auction mechanism is derived.
Our model captures the effects of demand uncertainty, share of GPO orders in the
advance sales market, demand and price uncertainty, and variation in production
cost. We investigate the effects of system parameters on the operation of the supply
chain, analytically and through a range of numerical experiments. Based on these
numerical results, we provide managerial insights into the operation of the group
purchasing organization and its effects on suppliers and buyers. In the cases where
the buyer’s market share is high or the supplier’s market share is low, participating
in the GPO significantly benefits the supplier. Because, in these two cases, the
supplier can reach a sizable advance sales market in the first period by participating
in the GPO. An increase in the buyer’s market share or a decrease in the supplier’s
market share implies a higher premium for the GPO and buyers. In addition, we
observe that for the GPO and suppliers, the group buying benefit decreases as the
variation in demand increases. However, high variation in production cost leads to
an increase in the GPO’s profit but adversely affects the supplier’s profit.
We conclude that a group purchasing organization helps buyers and/or suppliers
to mitigate demand and price risks in an effective way and benefits all parties
subject to certain conditions. This model can be extended in several ways. First, this
model can be extended to a supply chain with heterogeneous suppliers and buyers.
Second, this model assumes information asymmetry between suppliers and the
GPO. The GPO may generate a premium from this asymmetry. Extending this work
to a setting with full information requires deriving an optimal bidding strategy for
suppliers involving pricing and capacity decisions. In addition, different contract
types can be applied to this structure to determine how to incentivize the buyers and
suppliers to participate in GPOs effectively. Finally, the risk behavior of parties in
the supply chain can be considered. These are left for future research.
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Appendix A
We first define the equations for the expected sales SðA;DÞ, expected left-over
inventory IðA;DÞ, and expected lost sales LðA;DÞ for an on-hand inventory level
of A and random demand D with a cumulative distribution function of FDðxÞ as




IðA;DÞ ¼E½ðA  DÞþ ¼ A  SðA;DÞ ð22Þ
LðA;DÞ ¼E½ðD  AÞþ ¼ E½D  SðA;DÞ: ð23Þ
Proof of Proposition 1 If the buyer does not choose to work with the GPO, its
expected profit is written as in Eq. (1). The expected profit can also be expressed as
E½PNGr ðqNGÞ ¼ p wsp  er
 
E bDT½   wfp þ er
 
qNG þ wsp þ er
 
SðqNG; bDTÞ:




¼  er þ wsp
 
fBðqNGÞ\0:





¼  wfp þ er
 
þ wsp þ er
  oSðqNG; bDTÞ
oqNG
¼ 0
¼  wfp þ er
 
þ wsp þ er
 
1 FBðqNGÞð Þ ¼ 0:





As a result, the optimal advance order quantity for a buyer who uses the market
option in the first period is defined as in Eq. (4).
When the buyer chooses to work with the GPO, its expected profit function is
given as in Eq. (2). The expected profit can be rewritten as
E½P̂Gr ðqGÞ ¼ h p wsp  er
 




þ ð1 hÞE½PNGr ðqNGÞ
that is also a concave function of qG, that is,




¼ h er þ wsp
 
fBðqGÞ\0:






As a result, the optimal advance order quantity for a case where the buyer works
with the GPO is given as in Eq. (3). h
Proof of Proposition 2 The buyer prefers working with GPO in the first period if the
expected profit for this option is greater than or equal to the profit obtained when it
does not work with the GPO. The difference between the two expected profit
functions, E½P̂Gr ðqGÞ  E½PNGr ðqNGÞ 0, is written as
h ðwsp þ erÞSðqG; bDTÞ  wrqG  ðwsp þ erÞSðqNG; bDTÞ þ ðwfp þ erÞqNG
 
 0:
Dividing both sides of the above equation with hðwsp þ erÞ and writing SðqG;bDTÞ































replaced with FBðqGÞ and FBðqNGÞ, respectively. Thus, the above inequality can be
simplified as







It can be shown that the above inequality holds only if qG  qNG. This result gives
the condition in Proposition 2. h
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppliers whose production costs are greater than or equal
to the estimated auction price do not work with the GPO, that is, they do not allocate
any capacity to the GPO.
Suppliers whose production costs are less than ŵs prefer using the GPO option in
the first period. In this case, the expected profit function of a supplier using the GPO
option is given in Eq. (6). In terms of Eq. (21), the expected profit function is
restated as
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E P̂Gsj DG;DNGð Þjc\ŵs
h i












This is a concave function of DG, namely,
o2E P̂Gsj DG;DNGð Þjc\ŵs
h i
oD2G
¼  hðwsp  esÞfDGs ðM  DGÞ\0:
The optimal value of DG that maximizes the expected profit subject to the constraint
0DG  min M;QG
 
is determined in accordance with the unconstrained solution
for the problem, denoted as dG. The unconstrained solution for the problem is
obtained from the first-order condition as






Equation (8) gives the solution of the constrained problem, using the concavity of
the profit function.
If the supplier does not choose to work with the GPO, the expected profit can be
written as in Eq. (7) regardless of whether or not its production cost is less than ŵs.







¼ h wfp  es
 
D0NG þ wsp  es
 
SðM  D0NG;DGs Þ
 
 cM
þ ð1 hÞ wfp  es
 
DNG þ wsp  es
 



















¼  1 hð Þ wsp  es
 








¼  h wsp  es
 
fDGs ðM  D
0
NGÞ\0:
With the same steps that yield the optimal solution for the previous case, the






, together with the concavity of
the function, gives the solution of the optimal values of DNG and D
0
NG as given in
Proposition 3. h
Proof of Proposition 4 Supplier j, with c ŵs, joins the GPO if its expected profit is
higher with participation than non-participation. The difference in expected profits
between these two options can be written as


























 wfp  es
 
D0NG  wsp  es
 










Dividing both sides of the equation by ðwsp  esÞ and using FDGs ðM  d
0
NGÞ, defined









FDGs ðuÞdu ¼ D
0








When d0NG is smaller than zero, the above expression yields zero considering the
definition of D0NG. Otherwise, when d
0
NG is greater than or equal to zero, it will
definitely be greater than or equal to D0NG. With this argument and the basic
properties of the cumulative distribution function, we can show that the above
expression is less than or equal to zero. Therefore, given that supplier j’s production
cost is greater than or equal to ŵs, choosing the market option is always at least as
good as or better than choosing the GPO option. Accordingly, it never allocates a
portion of its capacity to the GPO.
































¼ ŵsDG þ wsp  es
 
S M  DG;DGs
 
 wfp  es
 
D0NG  wsp  es
 
S M  D0NG;DGs
 
:






















If the above expression is positive, supplier j prefers the GPO option given c\ŵs.
If ŵs wfp  es and wr wfp þ er hold, then DG will be greater than or equal to
D0NG due to their definitions. Therefore, the above expression can be simplified as
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D0NG
















When DG D0NG, we can show that the above equation is positive. As a result, we
conclude that given c\ŵs, supplier j definitely prefers working with the GPO when
ŵs wfp  es and wr wfp þ er. h
Proof of Proposition 5 The capacity allocated to the GPO is exactly the same for all
participating suppliers with c\ŵs. In addition, the allocated capacities are assumed
to be sold in batches. Therefore, kDG items are procured at the end of the auction. If
the allocated capacities and the total amount of procured items at the end of the
auction are normalized to DG, the mechanism analyzed corresponds to an auction in
which bidders bid for only one of k objects.
Milgrom (2004) proposes that if every bidder has a demand for just a single item
and can bid for only a single unit, then the uniform-price auction would be a
Vickrey auction. In this setting, truthful bidding is an optimal strategy for all bid-
ders. Accordingly, we conclude, following (Milgrom 2004), that truthful bidding is
an optimal strategy for all bidders in our setting. h
Proof of Proposition 6 Raghunandanan and Patil (1972) derive the probability
density and the moment generating functions of the order statistics where the sample
size is random. The authors also propose a special case where the variables follow a
uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] and the sample size follows a binomial
distribution.
In our model, the sample size follows a binomial distribution as stated in
Eq. (14), and the production cost of a supplier participating in the auction is uni-
formly distributed between c and ŵs. Therefore, we can directly use the approach
given in Raghunandanan and Patil (1972) to obtain the expression. h
Appendix B
Proposition 7 For a given wr quoted by the GPO, the buyer will work with the
GPO in the first period when E½PGr ðqGÞ  E½PNGr ðqNGÞ  0. Where DT follows a

















In addition, the total advance order quantity consolidated in the GPO is QG ¼ nqG.
On the other hand, if E½PGr ðqGÞ  E½PNGr ðqNGÞ\0, the buyer will use the
market option in the first period. Under this setting, when DT is uniformly dis-
tributed between dT and dT , the optimal advance order quantity, q

NG, is defined as
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qNG ¼
bdT þ b dT  dT
 










Proposition 8 Given that supplier j’s production cost is lower than the estimated
auction price, the supplier will be eager to work with the GPO when the GPO
option is more beneficial to him compared to the market option. Where DT is




if wsp  es  ŵs [ 0
0 otherwise








Supplier j never assigns a portion of its capacity for the GPO if its production
cost c is greater than or equal to the estimated auction price, that is, c ŵs.
Where DT follows a uniform distribution between dT and dT and a GPO is
operational and the supplier considers the market option more beneficial, the



















Where DT is uniformly distributed between dT and dT and no GPO is




if wsp  es wsp  wfp [ 0
0 otherwise









Proposition 9 When the supplier’s production cost is lower than the estimated
auction price and DT is uniformly distributed between dT and dT , the supplier









On the other hand, suppliers whose production costs are greater than or equal to
the estimated auction price would never consider the GPO beneficial to them.
Therefore, they would never participate in the auction.
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